El Salvador: Tips on Managing Crime and Avoiding Populism – or is it the other way round?

Greg Mills
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Executive Summary

El Salvador is adjudged the world’s most violent country, with a rate of 81 murders per 100,000 people in 2016 – more than three times that of Mexico, for example. San Salvador rivals Venezuela’s Caracas as the most murderous city at 137/100,000. The country is trapped in a vicious cycle of populism and insecurity. Because there is no security, there is little investment, no growth, few jobs, insufficient resources for security and thus an increase in insecurity. And the populism of the ruling FMLN has offered few answers, only greater problems. In this lie lessons for African states treading a populist path.
Introduction

The mountainous region of Morazán in El Salvador’s northeast was a guerrilla stronghold in the country’s 12-year-long civil war. The fighters enjoyed broad support then, as now, among the area’s impoverished farms and campesinos. The territory is hilly, wooded and, for the farmer, hardscrabble, but a perfect guerrilla playground and the site of much bitter fighting as the rebels attempted to cut the country in two, north to south, along the Rio Torola. In 1980, at the war’s start, the government identified 76 camps to the east of the river, ‘with tunnels, shooting ranges, and intelligence and defence systems, housing no fewer than 2 500 Cuban-trained irregulars.’

It ended along with the Cold War. Now on a Ruta de la Paz (‘Route of Peace’), near the Honduran border nearly 1 200 metres up, Perquín was the site of a rebel headquarters. Two decades later, the war museum in the village details the origins of the insurgency and the weapons used by both sides. The radio studio for Radio Venceremos (‘we will triumph’), at the centre of the guerrillas’ success in the propaganda war, is also on public display. The guides are former guerrillas, eking out a living from the tips of the sprinkling of tourists.

On 11 December 1981, US-trained soldiers of the government’s elite Atlacatl Battalion killed some 200 residents of the northern hill village of El Mozote, about ten kilometres down a cobbled and dirt track from Perquín.

A simple wall of remembrance skirts the edge of El Mozote’s main square alongside the Santa Katarina church where 146 children and two adults were taken outside and killed, among them Maria de la Paz Chicas’ pregnant sister and four-year-old child. ‘They brought all the people here,’ she says, ‘from Guacamaya, and killed them here. They told them they were going to give them food. They took all the young pretty women to the hills and raped them there for three days. The children,’ she says beckoning to a garden, ‘were killed there, where there is now the ‘Garden of Reflection of Innocence’. … They killed the men behind the fence,’ she says pointing in the opposite direction. ‘But they never found the bodies. They were totally burnt.’

El Salvador’s colonial history, like neighbouring Guatemala’s, has been one of oligarchic economic control and the envy, anger, unrest and, ultimately, violence it generated. It has left deep and abiding scars. But it also managed a difficult transition to peace in the early 1990s which provided it with a platform which a combination of crime, corruption and populism seeks to undo. This Discussion Paper identifies lessons from El Salvador’s transition and assesses its prospects of getting out of the mess in which it has found itself.

Oligarchies and Campesinos

In the 1700s, a small group of Spanish descendants – known as the ‘fourteen families’ – controlled the economy through especially the lucrative indigo trade. As synthetic dyes took over, coffee became the main export crop, accounting for 95 per cent of El Salvador’s foreign income by the 20th century and still controlled by a tiny elite. Uprisings against such inequity occurred sporadically throughout the century, including the infamous Matanza (‘massacre’) in 1932 of 30 000 political opponents, including notably the opposition socialist politician Agustín Farabundo Martí, executed by firing squad.
The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), founded in 1980, bears his name, its guerrillas dominating Morazán and El Mozote.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the vehicles for leftist political mobilisation drew their leadership from radical Roman Catholic groups and their liberation theology. By the 1970s, the civil conflict had developed into a struggle between anti-government guerrillas on one side and the government, paramilitaries and private ‘death squads’ on the other – the beginning of El Salvador’s 'tiempos de locura' or ‘season of madness’.

In October 1979, a reform-minded junta overthrew President Carlos Humberto Romero. The Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG) was inspired by a brand of left-wing politics. Under combined civilian-military leadership, the JRG devised a number of reforms during its tenure, which lasted until the elections of March 1982, including expropriating large landholdings along with commercial banking, coffee and sugar industries.

But even as these reforms proceeded, the war escalated. The assassination of popular opposition cleric Archbishop Óscar Romero while he was celebrating Mass in San Salvador on 24 March 1980 saw the country plunged into violent civil war. His funeral a week later ended in a bloody clash between demonstrators and security forces.

As the violence – which would cost as many as 75 000 lives and displace 1.5 million people – erupted, various peace initiatives reaped little reward. Then, the 1989 poll ushered into power businessman Alfredo Cristiani, who received 53.8 per cent of the votes representing the conservative Nationalist Republic Alliance or Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena). With business interests in coffee and pharmaceuticals, Cristiani had been drawn into politics at the beginning of the 1980s when the FMLN’s campesino followers, the rural poor dependent on agriculture, began squatting on farms.

### Cristiani and Peace

Under Cristiani’s watch, the UN-supervised and monitored peace process began in April 1990. On 16 January 1992, the Chapultepec Peace Accords were signed in Mexico, under the terms of which the rebel FMLN became an opposition political party.

Ending the civil war had a positive impact on stability and growth. Winning the peace is at least as important, but as El Salvador’s restive politics illustrate, it’s a long-term job.

‘If we had not had a democratic process, there would,’ reflects Cristiani, ‘be no peace. Our conflict was generated by a lack of political space. We also needed economic reform, in trying to deal with the macro-economic aspects of the conflict.’

A third aspect was, according to Cristiani, to align the military to the peace agreement, ‘to change their doctrine to become a more obedient institution so that if they don’t like something, there is no threat of a coup’.

As president of a country ‘coming out of war with a bad reputation’, Cristiani saw the need to get into ‘high labour intensive industry, the maquilas, and agro-industry beyond just producing food’. Growth improved during the 1990s on the back of this diversification drive from textiles into services, advised by those Salvadoreans known as the ‘Chilean Boys’, a group of Chicago-economists under Arnold Harberger who had been so influential in advocating reform in Pinochet’s Chile.

Arena presidents followed Cristiani in the elections of 1994 (Armando Calderón Sol), 1999 (Francisco Guillermo Flores Pérez) and 2004 (Antonio Saca), before former journalist Mauricio Funes broke the duck for the FMLN by taking power in June 2009.

Funes, whose brother was killed as a guerilla in the civil war, ran a moderate campaign, promising the retention of the US dollar as the official
currency (dollarisation took place in 2001 under Flores) and more attention to health care and crime prevention. Since then the FMLN has stayed put in power, winning the next election in 2014 with Salvador Sánchez Cerén, the first ex-guerrilla to make it to president.

Lauded as the first ‘progressive’ government in El Salvador’s history,4 however, criminality, corruption and lower growth has earmarked the FMLN’s tenure. Its fundamental problem appears to be in its preoccupation with power over results.

In February 2016, the El Salvador Supreme Court ruled that Funes would face a civil trial for charges of illegally laundering more than US$700 000 into his bank accounts. On 28 November 2017 Funes was found guilty of illegal enrichment. By then Nicaragua had granted political asylum to the former president. His predecessor Tony Saca was arrested in October 2016, accused with others in his administration of syphoning US$246 million of public money. The erosion of trust in public institutions is across parties. Saca’s Arena predecessor, Francisco ‘Paca’ Flores, had been accused (but never convicted) for having diverted US$15 million in funding from the Taiwan government, though this money ended up, as intended, with Arena.

The Corrosion of Corruption

‘We have gone off track,’ observes Cristiani, ‘because of corruption. When Saca – who was a disaster – entered government, corruption started to infest government institutions. Saca paid the President of the Supreme Court, for example, a monthly wage. When any country is corrupted in this way, then nothing works. People are no longer working for the country, but for themselves, to get rich.’

He links it with a rise of populism. ‘This started with Saca, again, and increased with Funes. A lot more welfare does not make necessarily,’ he notes, ‘for better citizens.’ Under the FMLN the civil service went from 100 000 to 150 000, and the public sector wage bill from 7 per cent to 9 per cent of GDP. ‘It might be okay if they were teachers, or policemen, but they are unfortunately not’ he says. ‘Instead they are in the bureaucracy, and have becoming a stumbling block to doing business. It takes two to three years to form a company here. Private investment,’ he sighs, ‘is now the lowest in Central America, even lower than Nicaragua. We used to be number two behind Costa Rica’.

But at the same time populism has made it much more difficult to unseat the FMLN, he admits. This is why it would be a ‘mistake’ for the opposition, he argues, ‘to say it will end welfare, at least not at the beginning’.

The FMLN’s Salvador Sanchez Ceren won the presidential run-off of March 2014 by just 0.19 per cent, or 6 000 votes in three million, a narrow margin from Arena’s Norman Quijano.

‘During the 1990s and early 2000s,’ says Pedro Argumedo of Fusades, a leading local think-tank, ‘the government had a clear reform agenda, to open up trade and investment, achieve macro-stability and ensure the conditions for a market economy. The FMLN, however, did not trust these reforms. It was less interested in wealth creation
than distribution. It focused less on growth than tax reform, though at the same time it displayed less capacity to manage the public service, which can be seen in the increase in crime.

While the economy had expanded at over 4 per cent during the 1990s, it rapidly tapered off under the FMLN, averaging just 1.9 per cent, the slowest in Central America from 2004 to 2016. Poverty fell by half during the Arena governments, to just 30 per cent, then rising once more to over 40 per cent, even though the FMLN government spent more, the fiscal deficit reaching 2.8 per cent of GDP, with debt rising from 2009 from 40 per cent to over 60 per cent of GDP.  

A Solidarity Network scheme, implemented in 2004, distributed between US$15 and US$20 monthly to the poorest households, rising to more than US$50 under Funes, along with the distribution of free foodstuffs, uniforms and agriculture packs, totalling US$400 million annually, or 10 per cent of government expenditure and more than three times the education budget.

Norman Quijano, former Mayor and Presidential candidate Quijano, who drifted into politics from his dentistry practice, agrees on the corruption effect. He believes that ‘the FMLN does not like democracy. They want total control. Instead of adhering to democracy, they use its institutions, corrupt them, and usurp the power for themselves. They have been hindered by the Constitutional Court, which has maintained the separation of powers. We have one of the most expensive democracies in the world – it cost 75 000 lives – but apparently we don’t value their sacrifice’ he muses.

The impact of Venezuela has not helped. The establishment of the Alba petroleum joint venture with FMLN-controlled municipalities has proven a funnel for funding and means of clientalism. Allegedly as much as US$1 billion has gone ‘missing’ in the process. The Alba venture is allegedly part of a complex money laundering operation involving the Maduro regime in Venezuela and their FARC Colombian ally. ‘We forget,’ Quijano reminds, ‘that when communists [such as the FMLN] get into power, it’s not easy to get them to let go.’

**GDP per capita comparison**

There are other pernicious if unintended aspects which reinforce consumption and lack of ownership. With the share of agriculture to GDP falling to less than 10 per cent of GDP and its share of employment to under 20 per cent, people have to make a plan. Some 3.5 million Salvadoreans live in the US, remitting US$5 billion, or nearly 20 per cent of GDP, annually. This has both helped to offset endemic un- and under-employment including ‘informality’, at over 70 per cent of the six million citizens who remain in the country, but too has reinforced a dependency culture.

There is good reason, however, why they leave if they can.

**Murder Capital**

‘Arena’s problem,’ says Ernesto ‘Neto’ Muyshondt, the Mayor of San Salvador of his own political party, ‘is that it did not keep reforming and strengthening our institutions. When it was in government,’ adds the lean 42-year-old, who holds a Master’s degree from Incae, a leading regional business school, ‘it was not interested in sharing power, in building consensus. The same failure,’
he says, ‘can be said also of the FMLN.’ Muyshondt inherits, at best, a very difficult situation.

The once grand and now fading facades of the old San Salvador peek from behind lines of informal traders who line the streets in the crowded centre of the city, around Archbishop Romero’s old Cathedral, national telecommunications building, Palacio Nacional and the old Antonio Bou hardware store. The traders are cheek by jowl in their plastic, canvas and wood stalls, hawking US$5 dresses, US$3 shoes, gaudily coloured electric fly-swats and backpacks among other tat, and ‘two for $1’ DVDs. Papa frites and grilled chicken stalls smoke and sizzle away, adding to the clutter and confusion. Cleaners with Gobierno de San Salvador stitched on the backs of their baby blue overalls steer their dust-carts past the traffic. The security forces patrols move quickly through the stalls and crowds. Sections of soldiers with M16 assault rifles in jungle camouflage outfits, some of their faces covered out of fear of recognition, there to protect the single policemen in their ranks distinctive in their sinister black uniforms.

In 2016, El Salvador was adjudged the world’s most violent country, with a rate of 81 murders per 100 000 people, more than three times that of Mexico for example, and the capital the most murderous city at 137/100 000. Attempts to crack down against the 60 000-strong maras (‘mara’ is slang for gang), notably the M-18, MS-13 and the Rebels 13 have done little to dull the surge in violent crime. Originating among the gangs and prisons of Los Angeles, the maras returned south to ply their trade in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. In 2015 alone, 61 policemen and 24 soldiers died in direct combat with gangs. With numbers like this, El Salvador is in a state of civil war.

José Antonio Almendariz Rivas left the army after 1992, the last commander of the infamous Atlacatl Battalion, disbanded on the peace agreement. As one positive measure of the country’s political progress, since then he has served 21 years as a Congressman for the National Coalition Party (PCN), the most powerful in the country during the 1960s and 1970s, but now with just eight of the 84 seats in Congress. The retired colonel has spent 18 years heading the parliamentary committee on security. While he notes that ‘Salvador has always been a violent place, which was worsened by the civil war and the civil disobedience that came before’, and while ‘it was true that it was once a police state, he describes the country as now being trapped in a vicious cycle. San Salvador’s streets are notable for dumpy security guards with pump-action shotguns loitering outside businesses, filling the security vacuum. Although the number of private security guards is officially around the same as the police (28 000), around 450 security companies are unregistered.

‘We have no security. Because of this we have no investment, no growth, no jobs, no resources for security and thus an increase in insecurity.’ The only way, he believes, to deal with the problem is through better training of the police force in the longer-term, and by in the short-term deploying the army in the cities and the police in the rural areas. ‘The situation is very bad with and for the police’ he says. ‘They only work 8-hour shifts. Since they don’t want to live in barracks, they are targeted by the maras when they go back to their homes. They are suspected and not trusted by the communities they are trying to defend.’ Quijano agrees. ‘The problems stem from the war,’ he notes,
‘as public security institutions were targeted and then, in the agreement, eliminated and new institutions created. A power vacuum ensued which has been filled by the maras, which is worsened by inequality and corruption.’

Muyshondt’s agenda for the city will aim to deal with insecurity, increase opportunities and improve a sense of order, including on the streets of San Salvador. ‘It’s not acceptable,’ he says pointing east from the terrace of our hotel, ‘that just 50 metres is a community living in a corriente, a stream, which puts them at risk several times every year when it floods. And they live side-by-side with $1 million mansions.’ Although policing, like defence, is a national responsibility, it would help, he says, to provide better public spaces for sport and culture, and for the city to lend more tools to the police including video surveillance. ‘But it does not help that we have politicised policing, based not on delivering capacity, but on providing jobs and political affiliations.’

But achieving his agenda will, he admits, need to get the population to engage beyond the headlines.

The Politics are Changing

Armando Calderón Sol, the first president elected after the civil war, reminded in 2010 that the political transition was not complete until the liberators had given up political power. ‘The defeat of ARENA at the polls is a victory for the political process, for democracy and for El Salvador,’ he said. ‘But only when the FMLN cede political power to someone else can the transition process be considered as finished.’

But politics are changing too. The political rise of the former Mayor of San Salvador, Nayib Bukele, hints at what might lie around the corner if Arena and the FMLN are not able to shed the tag of corruption and appeal to younger voters. Once a rising star of the FMLN, Nayib was expelled from the party over sexist comments, though opponents in the party may just have been anxious to get him out of the way. With 1.2 million Facebook followers, 441 000 on Twitter and 277 500 followers on Instagram, he offers a post-ideological brand as an alternative to traditional right–left divisions, though with little more than virtual content on pressing issues of growth, jobs and crime. His project, which ‘prefers advertising to organising,’ notes one writer, ‘is, essentially, himself.’

Muyshondt reckons that San Salvador’s debt could have quadrupled under Bukele’s administration, less because of infrastructure expenditure than long-term contracts. ‘One of the first things we will have to do is a detailed audit on where the money went’ he notes.

Still, the former mayor’s pulling power can be seen in his call to his former FMLN followers to stay away during the March 2018 elections. They did just that, with a low turnout of just 42 per cent (in a country where voting is mandatory) handing a resounding win to Arena, which won nine out of 14 major mayorships, including San Salvador, and 37 of 84 seats in the national assembly. One in ten voters defaced their ballots or left them blank. Little wonder, given that polls show that Salvadoreans believe that gangs – not government officials – ‘rule’ the country. In a 2017 survey 42 per cent of respondents believed gangs...
rule the country, 12 per cent saw the government in control, just 6 per cent answered that President Salvador Sánchez Cerén holds power, and only 3 per cent said the same about the FMLN.\textsuperscript{13}

Voters shifted from the FMLN in the March 2018 local and legislative elections, Arena winning 35 of 84 seats and the FMLN just 18.

Nayib’s popularity, populism and lack of policy content has prompted former President Cristiani to remark that he ‘would retire and emigrate’ if the 36-year-old won the election. Yet given the unpopularity of both the FMLN and Arena on account of corruption, no less than the \textit{Economist} judged that Nayib was the ‘front-runner’ for the 2019 presidential election following the outcome of the 2018 legislative election.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Winning the Vote}

Gerardo Dias is a campaign strategist for Carlos Calleja, 42, who won the Arena presidential position in a party run-off in May 2018. Unlike Muyschondt, whose cotton-growing father lost everything in the civil war ‘save his debts’, the US-educated Calleja’s family is one of the wealthiest in El Salvador, the owners of the \textit{Super Selectos} chain of some 98 supermarkets. This profile unfortunately reinforces stereotypes about the ‘progressive’ FMLN and ‘oligarchic’ Arena, the sort of polemic that the new breed of politicians will have to break if the country is to make progress.\textsuperscript{15}

‘Younger voters,’ says Dias, ‘are more attracted to the kind of profile enjoyed by [President Emmanuel] Macron in France, those who come from the world outside of politics.’ He cites recent surveys which show that as many as 70 per cent of Salvadoreans do not identify with any party, the highest such record in El Salvador’s polling history. ‘Whereas previously our loyal voting pool, like the FMLN, was 40\% of the electorate with 20\% as swing voters,’ illustrates Dias, ‘now less than 20\% can be considered loyalists. People are tired of old ideologies and more open-minded to change. They are more likely,’ he believes, ‘to challenge politicians.’

Winning them over will require going back to basics he says. ‘The paradox of the modern environment is that, while social media means you have more friends, relationships dilute – more people know, but they know less. Yet you have to fight harder for their attention.’ Thus he and Calleja have reverted in method to running ‘Town Hall’ meetings with interest groups – so-called \textit{Plataforma de Participacion Ciudadana} (‘Civic Participation Platforms’) – less to promote the party than to engage with civil society, exchange ideas and build relationships. These include groups of artists, entrepreneurs, fishermen, and factory workers. Similarly Muyschondt spent a lot of his campaign pounding the streets, going door-to-door in addition to the ubiquitous use of Facebook and other tools, in the process running the cheapest mayoral campaign for San Salvador in recent times, at just US$1.6 million.

Success will demand that they are ‘more than just a wrapper’ of slogans says Dias, reaching out to others for good ideas, including the likes of Costa Rica (on tourism), Israel (on agriculture), Colombia (security) and Spain (for low cost housing models). This contrasts with the FMLN, which is accused by civil society of not consulting outside of the party and its inner circle for advice and ideas, remaining ‘less new left than the old statist, socialist model’ says Muyschondt, ‘like Cuba and Venezuela.’

Calleja advocates a three-prong reform strategy focused on building a responsive government, tackling economic growth and seeking ‘unity in leaving behind the continuous fighting of the previous generations, since conflict has retarded our development. We need,’ states Dias, ‘to focus on the things we agree on like better education, health-care and ending violence.’
Ana Vilma de Escobar came from the social security commission to serve as President Tony Saca’s vice president. She has been under investigation for this period, like her erstwhile boss, she says, given that she launched an investigation into a mysterious car crash involving a Ferrari and, allegedly, a dead Colombian prostitute and President Funes. When she raised this in the Congress, the FMLN ‘threw me out of the Assembly, stripped me of my immunity and launched an investigation into the last 12 years of my financial affairs. This effectively meant I could no longer operate as a Congressional representative.’

Regardless, she recognises the responsibility of her own party in making the changes that are necessary for El Salvador to move forward. She says that until the country addresses its education system, they will battle to improve the ‘basic conditions’ in which the majority of the population finds itself. ‘Poor education is the basis for populist decisions’ she claims, ensuring ‘polarisation.’ Success will depend on increasing the opportunities for the population. ‘Most have no hope, expectations, education and prospects of a job. There is no other way out than the maras for many.’

But the FMLN is helped in this regard by Arena ‘not doing enough as a result of an internal struggle between those who want to adapt, and those who want to maintain the status quo and their living out of politics. The FMLN stay in power,’ she says, ‘since people do not see the change either in Arena.’

**Three Lessons from War to Peace**

Indeed, the lessons of El Salvador’s transition from war to peace are threefold:

Without political consensus and deal-making, peace would have been difficult to attain. Equally, the skills and leadership required to forge a working consensus within and between political parties has been lacking for most of the 2000s, foundering on a combination of elite and ideological intransigence and naked financial self-interest. There is a constant need for political savvy and compromise, as it was in El Salvador in 1992, in order to achieve the continuity required for economic development. This applies, too, to the role of civil society as both a check and balance and adviser to government, which has all but been cut off from access to the administration during the FMLN period of government.

Political support has encouragingly reflected the performance of political parties. ‘The levels of dissatisfaction with both the FMLN and Arena,’ says Fusades’ Alvaro Trigueros Arguello, a leading think-tank, ‘reflects their failure to satisfy the needs of the population, especially in dealing with crime and delivering social results.’ There is a need for parties to understand what the voters want rather than presume as much, at least as much as an imperative to understand their opponents.

Third, El Salvador’s initially successful transition from war to peace – and subsequent slide towards populism and weakened governance – has lessons for leadership. Cristiani advises in this regard that: ‘You have to lead towards things with a high moral goal. You have to use it for something good for the general population. You have to lead by example. You have to listen a lot; and learn from what you hear. But you also have to take risks. You have to understand that you will not always get the support of everyone. Your actions have always to be in the interests of the majority of people, not just a few, and not just yourself.’

And, in his darker moments, he thinks that perhaps ‘we might benefit from a benevolent dictatorship. Then I am reminded that while they might start benevolent, they usually end up a dictatorship.’
Endnotes

1. Interview with General Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez Avendano, San Salvador, 13 December 2010. Together with Colonel Adolfo Majano, General Gutiérrez was part of the junta following the overthrow of President Carlos Humberto Romero in October 1979. In December the following year, Majano resigned from the junta and José Napoleón Duarte was appointed President and Gutiérrez as Vice President. These appointments lasted until the May 1982 transfer of power to President Álvaro Magaña.

2. This section is based on visits to El Salvador in December 2010 and, again, in March 2018. Grateful appreciation is expressed to Luis Membreno for his kind assistance in organising these and other meetings.


5. According to a 2017 testimony to the US Senate, ‘ALBA Petróleos serves as a critical part of a multi-national money laundering operation, constructed and operated by members of the Bolivarian alliance. ALBA Petróleos’ management is entrusted exclusively to the inner circle of the governing Frente Farabundo Martí Para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) party in El Salvador.’ See https://www.dugcaucus.senate.gov/sites/default/files/Douglas%20Farah%20Testimony_Senate%20Caucus%20on%20International%20Narcotics%20Control%20.pdf.

7. This section is based on visits to El Salvador by Dr Mills in December 2010 and, again, in March 2018. Grateful appreciation is expressed to Luis Membreno for his kind assistance in organising these and other meetings.


