AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT NARRATIVE
What Role for the Security Sector?

Terence McNamee, Greg Mills, Sacha Tomes and Gordon Yekelo
Contents

Introduction ......................................................... 3
The security piece .................................................. 5
Country cases ...................................................... 6
Cross-cutting themes .............................................. 8
Areas for further study ........................................... 9
Conclusion .......................................................... 11

About the Authors

Drs Terence McNamee and Greg Mills are Deputy Director and Director respectively of The Brenthurst Foundation. Colonel Sacha Tomes is the head of the British Peace Support Team (South Africa). Major General Gordon Yekelo retired in 2017 as General Officer Commanding Training Command, South African National Defence Force.

Published in April 2017 by The Brenthurst Foundation
E Oppenheimer & Son (Pty) Ltd
PO Box 61631, Johannesburg 2000, South Africa
Tel +27–(0)11 274–2096 · Fax +27–(0)11 274–2097
www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org

All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored, or transmitted without the prior permission of the publisher. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged.

Layout and design by Sheaf Publishing, Benoni.
Introduction

Before understanding how the security sector in Africa can contribute to the continent’s development – and conversely, how it can impair progress, too – it is necessary to first describe the dynamic global political and economic environment in which these questions are considered.

Globalisation is an ineluctable backdrop to virtually every sphere of human activity today – yet its contribution to overall human welfare has never been more contested. The positive narrative on globalisation comprises everything from enormous progress on public health worldwide (e.g. polio reduction) and the spreading of democratic norms and free trade to extraordinary advances in technology transfer and declines in absolute poverty.

The flip side of globalisation is the rapid rise in nationalism and populism worldwide, which is fuelled by a mounting sense that, despite evidence of progress, our lives are getting worse. A growing band of critics argues that globalisation has disempowered people/national governments/citizens etc, frozen real incomes and generally made life worse for the masses while a transnational elite is getting ever and ever richer. We have also witnessed a loss of trust in systems, leaders and expert knowledge. There are departures from this narrative, to be sure. Not least one could point to the rise of Asia and the leading role China has adopted in championing globalisation. Yet, overall, the world is gripped by a debilitating anxiety over whether human progress has stalled. Political debate turns less on Left and Right today than on a struggle between the advocates of openness and those wanting to build walls and turn inwards. The election of US President Donald Trump, the UK’s impending exit from the European Union and the concomitant emergence of post-truth politics punctuate fears over what comes next.

Will non-Western powers play a bigger role in global stability? Is the once-robust international recognition of nations’ mutual interdependence in tackling the world’s gravest challenges – climate change, forced migration, extremist violence – receding? Faced with such an array of challenges, is the international community collectively able to, in the words of Napoleon, define reality and offer hope?

Africa

Africa is central to ‘what comes next’ – not least due to its booming population – even though it remains at the margins of global politics and power. The loss of trust within African societies reflects the global mood, yet within Africa there are some distinct historical features. In South Africa for instance, the particular forms of alienation and even nihilism present especially (though not exclusively) in townships relates in part to the failure to undertake peace-building and ‘conflict termination’ processes. In communities that were ravaged by the violent popular uprising in the struggle against apartheid, people have been provided with some (however meagre) financial means to repair historical injustices though there remains deep sociological and psychological
damage to communities that results in volatility and instability.

Overall in Africa, the continent’s population is rising faster than any other region. It is expected to more than double by 2050 to 2.4 billion. According to the United Nations, Africa is expected to account for more than half of the world’s population growth between 2015 and 2050. Africa’s share of global population is projected to grow to 25 per cent in 2050 and 39 per cent by 2100. Africa’s population growth compared to the rest of the world’s demographic decline means that it will be increasingly differentiated by the age of its population. Africa will be much younger than the rest of the world.

Most of this population growth will occur in Africa’s cities. The countries south of the Sahara are projected to be the most rapidly urbanising region on the planet, with the percentage of people living in its cities rising by 16 per cent to reach a level of 56 per cent by 2050. Over this period, some 2.5 billion people will be added to the urban population worldwide, with almost 90 per cent of this increase occurring in Asia and Africa. Nigeria, Africa’s most populated country, is set to nearly double in population in 20 years, an alarming prospect given how little attention ‘human development’ has received in large parts of the country, not least its restive north-east.

Properly harnessed, and planned for, Africa’s population increase and the unique presence of so many young people could result in the much analysed ‘demographic dividend’ which helped drive East Asia’s economic growth a generation ago. As ever, so much will rest on improvements in Africa’s governance and growing Africa’s economies to provide sufficient employment and adequate education. Worryingly, there has been considerable democratic backsliding in Africa during the past decade, with vast parts of the continent now classified in one respected global ranking as ‘not free’ or only ‘partly free’ are marked as ‘free’. And although nearly every country in Africa now holds multi-party elections, increasingly their conduct and results are contested and some incumbents cling to power in violation of their constitutions and against the will of the people. Economically, we must also recognise that despite the rhetoric around ‘Africa Rising’, the continent’s share of global manufacturing is falling while its expenditure on research and development is also dropping in comparative terms. Save pockets of civil strife, including the ongoing ruinous civil war in Africa’s newest state, South Sudan, major wars and armed conflict have dropped considerably from the post-Cold War highs of the 1990s. Nonetheless, political volatility and the risk of armed conflict remain significant across the continent.

The relationship between democracy and economic growth merits further research, though evidence of a strong correlation is persuasive. There are outliers both in Africa (Ethiopia and Rwanda, notably) and elsewhere (China) but overall, it was argued, robust rule of law and independent accountability mechanisms are generally vital to create sustainable GDP growth over the long-term. That assessment was, however, subjected to some sharp scrutiny.

Four main observations on Africa were highlighted:

• Urbanisation and population growth present significant opportunities – and real challenges – for African countries.
• The nature of political challenges – and violence – will depend on the weakness of central governments, their vulnerability to failure, and their ability to deliver.
• Despite the best of intentions (and sometimes because of the worst), it not clear that aid – in whatever form – can make the long-term governance difference in this regard.
• There are many potential flash-points, including the confluence of (young) people plus internet devices; migration constraints;
systemically low commodity prices and a lack of diversification to provide jobs; climate change; failure in bigger economies (SA, Nigeria); relative global disinterest and/or change in aid regimes; and, most importantly, failure to change the political economy and improve governance.

It was suggested that in the light of these highly fluid developments in Africa and a dynamic global environment, three scenarios present themselves:

1. Furtherance of the ‘African rising’ narrative, with improvements in the continental political and economic space, buoyed by favourable economic conditions;
2. Reversion to the ‘hopeless continent’ story, marked by accelerated democratic backsliding and associated surge in corruption and economic mismanagement, exacerbated by a retreat from globalisation and a downturn in commodity prices; and
3. The more likely scenario, a patchwork quilt, an increasingly bifurcated situation of successes and failures, notable progress in some political and economic areas but equally prominent failures in others.

The security piece

Several tensions and ambiguities came to the fore in discussions about what the military can and should be doing in the development space in Africa. Beyond its traditional role in defending national security and territorial integrity, a number of potential functions present themselves. Depending on its size, orientation, sophistication and financial health, militaries and defence sector more generally (including the defence industry) can assist a nation’s development over an extremely wide spectrum of areas – ranging from the incidental advantages gained from training such as increased literacy to major construction and research programmes.

At the same time, there are numerous examples of African militaries who have effectively been counter-development. That is typically so where their principal, if not sole, objective is to maintain undemocratic regimes. Often in such contexts major failings in the recruitment process are evident: in many African countries militaries have been derided as an ‘army of cousins’ – i.e. a form of jobs and promotions for connected families. Where civilian oversight is weak or non-existent, ‘mission creep’ and the capacity of poorly-led and constituted militaries to inflame internal conflict is an ever-present danger. Too little attention is paid to questions of efficacy and purpose, and whether in particular circumstances there is even a need for conventional armed forces. More out-of-the-box thinking needs to be deployed on the relationship between development and the appropriate security requirement in each national context.

It is also the case that the military’s role in development will not be constant over time. Countries emerging from periods of prolonged conflict may require the military to undertake not only stabilisation tasks, but also leading roles in a host of development activities, where in more advanced economies they would be expected to have little or no role. We also need to take great care in defining what we mean by ‘development’. Clear delineation should exist between various forms of emergency assistance (e.g., flood relief) that militaries may provide on an ad hoc basis, and the institutionalised long-term roles armed forces can play (for example, Sri Lanka’s urban development unit, Ghana’s infrastructure battalion, and the Malawian armed forces’ role in combating deforestation). Of particular note is the mandate, role and resource allocation for Army Engineer Corps, which potentially offer a national capability rather than merely a defence role. This could have implications for how states structure their national development plans. One participant observed that the energy, skills and utility of African militaries need to be marshalled towards development ends in times of peace, not lie dormant as an expensive ‘spare capacity’. Overall, the role of leadership and
the type of leaders that the military produces will, as ever, be a vital determinant of whether or not it is a force for good in a nation’s development.

Country cases

Detailed assessments of the development roles militaries have played across a number of countries highlighted both opportunities and challenges.

Under apartheid, the role of the South African armed forces and security services was to safeguard a racial oligarchy (through actions domestically and regionally) but over time they too became almost irrelevant as various pressures – from internal opposition, internationally and within the regime itself – resulted in a dramatic transition in the security sector. The transformation of the South African Defence Force (SADF) into the South African National Defence Force heralded a fundamental break with the past, in the role the military – now comprised of former foes and various groups previously excluded from service – would play in helping to repair a fractured society and contributing to nation building and social cohesion. While the SANDF has played a significant part in shaping democratic South Africa, now nearly a quarter of a century old, challenges remain. South Africa is a post-conflict society but it seems either perennially ‘in transition’ or simply stuck, depending on one’s perspective. On several fronts, the authority of the state is being challenged once again, primarily due to poor leadership and corruption. A large chunk of the country’s majority black population has seen little progress in their own ‘development’ since the end of apartheid and this represents an (understandable) source of potential instability.

Today the South African state has legitimacy, having been democratically elected into power. Unlike during Apartheid, the cabinet and national executive committee have more power than the security structures. But what role does the military play in these new, increasingly volatile circumstances, especially if there is a reversion to rule by ‘securocrats’ and the situation begins to unravel? Under such circumstances will the SANDF come under pressure to embrace new roles – such as tackling public service delivery protests or Arab Spring-like youth revolts? How can the armed forces create new partnerships across society to help to ensure that South Africa does not go down that path?

Colombia has experienced nearly as dramatic a transition in a society as South Africa. Once the world’s most famous narco-state, paralysed by rampant criminality, assassinations and a Maoist insurgency (FARC) that dominated vast parts of the country, today Colombia is lauded globally for transforming its political, economic and security environment. While much work remains to cement sustainable peace, Colombia’s reformed security forces have been central to turning the tide against the forces of counter-development nationwide. The Colombian example suggests a number of lessons that could be applied to other intractable security contexts. However, circumstances in Colombia, as elsewhere, are distinct. As such, it is imperative that whatever learnings are taken from other environments, a country must avoid adopting foreign templates wholesale. Rather, each country should develop its own model to restore security. Without that particularity, it will not be possible to retain legitimacy with locals. The Colombian experience also highlighted the necessity to formulate a
plan to restore security as part of a holistic state effort, with each element inculcating and committing to a single mandate. Excellent leadership, as is evident across all case studies, is a force multiplier and sine qua non to success. Resources and budget allocations were also carefully calibrated to specific problems and solutions. All too often in fragile security environments monies are spent on security-related initiatives and equipment inappropriate to the needs at hand. And lastly, Colombia illustrates that development is impossible without first establishing a modicum of security (indeed, as one participant observed, ‘conflict is development in reverse’). That lesson points to the primacy of security forces at the outset of a recovery and reconstruction process – e.g., rebuilding Kabul airport, restoring the power supply in Kosovo – though thereafter great care needs to be given to the role of the military in subsequent phases of development.

Singapore is perhaps the standout example of holistic economic transformation globally in the second half of the 20th century. The contribution of the security forces in taking Singapore from a newly-independent South East Asian city-state in the mid-1960s that was poor and riven with fault-lines, to an economic powerhouse with a higher GDP per capita than the former colonial power, the United Kingdom, is instructive. Initially, independent Singapore perceived itself as highly vulnerable – due to a small land area, lack of strategic depth, no natural resources, its water imported from its neighbour and a slew of historical tensions. Conscription and national service was introduced (and remains, with service continuing for several weeks per year until citizens turn 40), in part for defence of the country but also to help build a sense of national identity amongst its disparate communities. Against the backdrop of preparing for ‘total defence’, the development of a professional officer corps proceeded in tandem with a commitment to develop skills and educated personnel that could contribute to newly industrialising Singapore. Specialist skills in areas like logistics, engineering, project management, personnel management and finance were developed across the security services. All the while, Singapore’s ‘whole of government’ approach meant there was close interaction between the security services and other sectors of government, business and society. Singapore’s fledgling defence industry concentrated on the need for affordable ‘kit’ and acquiring platforms from elsewhere that could be adapted to local requirements. Over time, Singapore progressed a nascent industry into a suite of globally competitive capabilities in aerospace and marine technology – with wide applications outside defence. In multifaceted ways, the ‘defence piece’ was integral to Singapore’s dramatic rise to global development standard bearer.

Compared to the above cases, Kenya has not experienced as dramatic a transformation in either its economic or political fortunes, but its military has similarly played an essential role in its development trajectory since independence. From its inception the military has sought to reflect Kenyan society-at-large in all its ethnic and regional diversity and in so doing serve as a force for nation building and social cohesion. Kenya’s armed forces have provided an institutional buffer against what traditionally has been a highly ethno-politised state. Under the rubric of ‘aid to
the civil power’ the Kenyan military has often been called upon to assist in humanitarian disasters, emergency tasks such as the airlift of citizens from South Sudan in 2013 or anti-poaching as well as recent security operations both within the country (north-east) and its maritime waters and in neighbouring Somalia. Regarding the mooted security wall between Kenya and Somalia, at present only the military has the capacity for that scale and type of project. The provision of continuous training within the military has created a deep reservoir of skills which can be ploughed back into Kenyan society. The potential areas of activity that benefit Kenya and elsewhere are almost limitless, but the briefest list would include: logistics, conservation, industry, health, education, transport, survey, engineering, construction, besides more general qualitative aspects of leadership development. There have been concerns that the government could become ‘addicted’ to calling in the military to perform civilian tasks, however, due to the military’s reputation for ‘getting things done’. Extending and over-funding the military’s role – institutional overreach – always carries the risk of degrading its core capacities, militarising the country’s politics and, in extremis, a military coup.

Cross-cutting themes

The technological base on which nations the world over have developed advanced economies has often been driven by innovations in the defence industry. As such, its role in society for good – or ill – bears careful scrutiny. The platform provided by a nation’s defence industry has, for all the negative popular caricatures, made huge strides in various fields, notably engineering; helped create an industrial base and manufacturing sector in numerous societies; fed dual-use technologies into the wider economy; and traditionally been a very significant provider of employment and skills development. South Africa, however, is the only significant example in sub-Saharan Africa to assess how investment in the defence industry has contributed to a nation’s development. South Africa boasts both significant state-run defence manufacturing and research, and also a burgeoning private sector industry, notably the Paramount Group, the largest privately-owned defence and aerospace company in the southern hemisphere. Founded nearly 25 years ago, the company has succeeded through the calibre of African skills and know-how in the face of considerable international scepticism that a sophisticated defence capacity could be established on the continent. In most of Africa, however, since domestic defence manufacturing needs are well beyond present abilities, a focus on building repair and upgrading capacity might be more appropriate.

One of the educational challenges going forward in the military more generally will be how it adapts to and keeps up with how the younger generation learn, use and embrace new technology

Public perceptions of investment in defence typically fixate on equipment and material when in fact a large proportion of military budgets are spent on people. How societies get the most value out of that spend relates, at least in part, to what happens after young men and women complete their careers, mindful that military service is in most (though certainly not all) cases a ‘young person’s game’. How the training and education young people receive in service can be of value to the national economy once they leave service is a key consideration, though there will always be a tension given the military’s desire for longer retention. Unquestionably one of the attractions of military service for young people (especially from disadvantaged backgrounds) is the opportunity to receive otherwise elusive, high-quality training in a structured learning environment. They can also learn a trade and gain various types of civilian accreditation. One of the educational challenges going forward in the military more generally will
be how it adapts to and keeps up with how the younger generation learn, use and embrace new technology – which is often highly intuitive, independent and shorn of the traditional ‘manual style’ approach. One participant, in advocating for a ‘whole life’ perspective on what the individual recruited into the military can eventually contribute to overall development, cited the example of the US G.I. Bill after the Second World War as an instructive model for the vital issue of resettlement of soldiers into society and getting them back into the workforce. Roughly ten years after the end of the war over two million veterans had used the G.I. Bill education benefits in order to attend colleges or universities, and an additional 5.6 million used these benefits for some kind of training program. Historians and economists judge the G.I. Bill a major political and economic success. Its return on investment for the American taxpayer was US$6.90 for every US$1 invested. Early reports show the post-9/11 G.I. Bill could yield as high as US$8 to every US$1 invested.

Leadership skills gained in the course of military service are particularly important for both the nation and its armed forces. But in recent years leadership training within the military has undergone significant changes to adjust to the demands of an almost infinitely complex set of circumstances on the modern battlefield. Today’s range of missions – from DDR to peacekeeping, peace building, peace enforcement, counter-insurgency, and so on, are complex and difficult. No one who has commanded soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan or Somalia, the Congo or South Sudan could argue differently. And it will only get more complicated with urbanisation, climate change and population growth. As one participant hypothesised, imagine dealing with security issues in a city of 40 million, that is half flooded and three quarters out of control? Today’s leadership training needs to prepare officers both to be tactically adept and also to fully grasp their role in achieving a broader political aim. Of utmost importance is the ability to instil very high levels of discipline in leadership so they can ensure their soldiers do not alienate the people they are there to protect. What sort of institution produces these qualities? Institutions which understand their correct place in the nation and society – where ends, ways and means are aligned – are most capable of contributing to overall societal development. But this demands comprehensive and consistent transfer of values through education and training establishments; systems to assess, reward and censure performance; and adequate resourcing. The best people should also be channelled into the training establishments as instructors – they come out better, and so do their students. The UK Army’s Generalship programme was highlighted as a potential model of leadership training that holds wider application across society. This programme is designed to provide knowledge and skills helpful to newly promoted general officers in leading and managing the Army as an institution. It places the Army in its political, economic and social context, uses outside speakers wherever possible to challenge and provide an external perspective, and has a strong personal development module. This includes a focus on the thinking skills required of a senior leader in order to make best use of evidence, and avoid group think and optimism bias.

Areas for further study

The plight and direction of young people today requires closer examination in the context of what the armed forces and security sector might offer – whether by example or direct participation. South Africa, for instance, is beset by turmoil in its universities and a younger generation that appears to be losing faith in traditional modes of engagement and dialogue. The growing proclivity to ‘destroy and burn’ rather than engage throws up numerous questions about how a society can reaffirm notions of discipline, respect and responsibility.
and burn’ rather than engage throws up numerous questions about how a society can reaffirm notions of discipline, respect and responsibility. At several points in the discussion the issue of national youth service, in whatever form, was highlighted as a potential counter to this trend. Although there is considerable hostility towards the concept of conscription today, ideas around national youth service programmes (e.g. Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania) could afford opportunities to reconnect and re-engage young people currently alienated from the state. National service could involve extended voluntary military service, which would comprise associated skills training and education programmes. The military’s role in helping to restore values of citizenship, identity and pride percolated throughout the dialogue, though no clear recipe for how national service – mechanisms, tools, skills – might work was put forward in any detail.

The role of intelligence as part of the security sector was scarcely mentioned during the dialogue, yet it has a number of (largely unheralded) contributions to make to the discussion on Africa’s development. Intelligence can provide decision-makers, for instance, with high level inter-departmental assessments of the real socio-economic and socio-political challenges facing the country. Departments are notoriously short-term (programme) orientated and prefer a silo approach – intelligence can provide an integrated picture, build it into scenarios and estimates and point out the risks and challenges line departments often tend to ignore or suppress. Intelligence can also help to identify those factors that prevent or undermine the successful implementation of developmental strategies and policies, including where government structures fail to act efficiently and effectively. In the case of African countries and elsewhere, detailed intelligence reports (for example the US annual National Intelligence Estimates) can draw the government’s attention to issues that can have a seriously destabilising effect on societies: lack of clinics or public services in certain rural areas; cattle rustling; and other ‘softer’ issues that would otherwise be ignored or unnoticed until it’s too late. The pervasive problem in Africa, however, is the frequent use of intelligence purely to serve incumbents’ desire to maintain their hold on power. Rarely is intelligence built around objective assessments of the real factors that will destabilise countries and corresponding recommendations for prioritising funding. The end result is that government planning is done in a vacuum, without the benefit of reliable data and information.

The role of women in security and related impact on development in Africa also received scant attention. Often ignored in the African context, the need to improve awareness of gender issues across the security landscape is vital. The issue of Reserve Forces and their potential to contribute to social cohesion and community building also merits further scrutiny. The global response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2014/15 highlighted myriad issues around the response of militaries and societies to pandemics and public health crises. Although there were positive takeaways from how local (especially Sierra Leonean) and international militaries were deployed to combat the crisis, overall the learnings may have just begun on everything from civil-military relations in public health emergencies to disease prevention within troops. Levels of societal preparedness (including the military component) to combat the next disease outbreak – of which there is an alarming array of possibilities – requires urgent scrutiny and further study. The Ebola crisis demonstrated that for African armed forces to adequately look after their own soldiers they must invest in understanding infectious disease outbreaks and in developing medical countermeasures. Looking to the future, events in Syria illustrate that the prospects of biological and chemical attacks can hardly be discounted. The need to redouble
efforts to improve medical countermeasures and also strengthen health systems to cope with new forms of terror attacks are essential. The issue of force **professionalism** also arose in the context of Colombia’s top-down approach. Questions arise on the need to facilitate bottom-up approaches in African contexts where isolated pockets of excellence are the norm and examine the role (if any) of outsiders to contribute to enhancing military professionalism. Strong civil-military relations are critical to ensuring the security sector is a force for good in society; where such relations are weak and professionalism is wanting, development will inevitably be (often grossly) impaired.

And lastly, forced **migration** – and the related issue of border security – is widely predicted to expand in scale and accelerate rapidly as population pressures bear down on some of the most fragile and weakest economies in the world. What might be the most effective uses of militaries and troops to address an issue that will impact not just African but global development in myriad ways in the coming decades?

### Conclusion

The narrative on defence and development in Africa is changing. Not so long ago the idea of ‘defence’ contributing positively and substantively to nations’ development would have been roundly derided, such was the dire reputation of most African militaries. Underpinned by stronger civil military relations, leadership and professionalism, the security sector is increasingly seen as a potential asset to African development in myriad ways. Their essential role in countering direct modern-day challenges to development – such as cyber-security, piracy, money laundering or terrorism – is clear. Yet it is to the broader, subtler and less direct contributions defence can offer that this Dialogue turned time and again.

Africa faces a range of formidable challenges related to a combination of fast demographic change, with a doubling of its population to over two billion in the next generation, and equally rapid urbanisation, set against weak government capacity, low rates of job creation, inadequate infrastructure and the spectre of climate change. Handled right, and planned for, coupled with the spread of technology and encouragement of innovation, the youth bulge could present an enormous, unprecedented economic opportunity, as it has in East Asia. Handled badly, it could threaten already fragile states and the stability of the continent as a whole, with global consequences, not least vastly increased migration. If Nigeria, for example, with a projected 440 million people by 2050, were to fail, the consequent challenges to stability in Europe would be enormous. It is in the enlightened self-interest of all to find the means to work together to strengthen states, improve governance, create jobs and ensure security.

While there are clear political and practical limits to their role, the military and other security agencies can help surmount these challenges and foster development, not just by providing the stability which is a prerequisite to sustainable economic growth, but also in more actively pursuing a range of secondary roles. The latter include the improvement of the reservoir of skills available to national economies, contributing to infrastructure development, providing emergency relief, and more generally helping to build a national esprit de corps through professionalism.

The latter is especially important at moments when public trust in government institutions is low. Improving the capacity and effectiveness of African militaries is both a historical and ongoing challenge.

Incentives and fresh metrics are part of the answer. Singapore, as illustrated above, has done so through the twin mechanisms of national service (to create a sense of national purpose) and by linking the pay of officers to the overall health and growth of the economy.

Deepening domestic and regional public-private collaboration, in health, technology and equipment procurement, for example, is another piece.

So is security collaboration between Africa and the rest of the world.

This is nothing new. In the former French colonies, this has taken more direct forms, increasingly
on demand, as the rescue of the political situation in Mali in 2013 illustrates. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) has provided a range of military assistance across the continent since it was established in 2007, from support to the AU mission in Somalia to assistance in Liberia as part of the response to the Ebola outbreak.

There have been other steady-state engagements, including through the many British Peace Support Teams dotted across the continent. These, as with other similar groups, provide limited support to African defence institutions alongside substantial tactical support in the form of providing equipment and training for African troops destined for UN or AU missions.

In an interdependent, complex and possibly more unstable world, more collaboration is, however, needed. Cooperation has to be ‘top-down’, from the strategic level, rather than simply attempted ‘bottom-up’ from the operational, tactical realm.

This will not be easy to achieve. Many African governments remain fiercely suspicious of international intentions, in part a consequence of colonialism, and in part because some are anti-development. Building up levels of trust and confidence to engage is challenging, not least where liberation movements still prevail. The Prussian soldier thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, argued that strategy was the presence of a single purpose through changing circumstances, in order to make effective use of scarce resources. The single purpose must be to maintain, in the face of populism, the values of openness and partnership over autarky.